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1. The problem of equality 
1.1 Dual passions 
 
Equality is a mathematical concept that induced the guillotine (notwithstanding liberty and 
fraternity). This conclusion of the Enlightenment tells the astounding and unnatural duality of 
the two faces of the coins of this currency. With equality, contrary to Hume’s view, a notion 
from reason sets passions ablaze. For no other issue can a mere structural property stir up so 
intense emotions. Anger is the common reaction to the irrationalities of arbitrariness and 
partiality. On the one hand, indeed, throughout human history, in revolutions and wars of 
independence many people chose to die for equality and no fewer to kill for it. Lack of 
equality incenses social protests and fuels social movements. It arouses the most burning 
social sentiments, whether righteous indignation against injustice or pitiful envy and jealousy. 
Instances are the outrages of subjection, domination, discrimination, exploitation, starvation 
amid plenty, favouritism and nepotism. On the other hand, however, the analysis of social 
equality (the discipline of isology) also arouses passions of another kind, mathematical, by 
being one of the most formatized and logic-intensive field of social science. It includes, for 
instance, the logic of equal treatment and non-sufficient reason (a topic shared with the 
philosophy of probabilities), the modern developments of Aristotle’s “arithmetic or 
geometric” dichotomy, the parallel roles of equality in the theory of justice and of symmetry 
in that of physics, and the concept- and theorem-rich formal theories of social justice, fairness, 
equity (the latin name for equality), equality in liberties and opportunities, reciprocity, envy 
and its absence, optimum and just distribution and taxation, and the comparison and measure 
of inequalities. 
 
1.2 Why compare? Evils of equality and of its absence 
   2 
Is, however, equality the right question? It is comparison. But why compare? Isn’t the matter 
what each person has – in goods, possibilities, welfare, dignity, respect, consideration, etc. –, 
full stop? Why nosy comparisons with others? Why not mind each person’s own business? If 
this is because this person is envious, jealous or covetous, is this a good reason? Should we 
give her the other’s good to sooth this pain? Or shouldn’t we discard, indeed blame and 
condemn, such ugly and vicious feelings (envy is “the most odious and anti-social of 
sentiments” John Stuart Mill wrote, “not a passion but a disease” Elster added). If the 
comparison arouses some painful sentiment of inferiority or judgment as such by others, or 
more serious shame, or sentiments of superiority, pride and vainglory for the other person, 
should these feelings be taken into account – at least to what extent – on should they rather be 
adjusted by education and the progress of morality or psychoanalysis? At any rate, are not 
comparative sentiments, whether righteous or vicious, the sole responsibility (or 
accountability) of their holders? 
 
  On general grounds, is not the peculiar choice of equality arbitrary, unjustified, 
irrational? Why “choose equality if there is no reason for inequality”, as so many have 
proposed, since the same logic leads one to choose any  inequality as well if there is no reason 
for anything else? Is “why not?” a serious answer to “why?” Is not valuing equality just the 
mere aesthetic appreciation of evenness or symmetry – a rather bourgeois or military taste, but 
what else can be the motive, in art-loving Greece, of Procrustes who equalizes people’s height 
by shortening or extending passers-by to make them equally match the size of his bed in a 
kind of anticipation of the equalitarian revolutionary guillotine? Is not equality the leveling of 
ambitions (“he who rises will be brought down” says a popular revolutionary song), the 
flattening of natural diversity, possibly the erasing of the variety of cultures which constitutes 
the main value of mankind? Is not famously equality the enemy and destroyer of liberty? 
Equal incomes jeopardize incentives to earn, savings for growth, support of the arts (and, 
indeed, equal self-ownership, and equal happiness since people have different capacities to 
enjoy). Aren’t we better protected by hierarchical armies, more efficiently fed by 
hierarchically organized productive firms? Aren’t the masterpieces of civilizations the product 
of vast labour exploitation often of the most insufferable and odious kind (no Louvre, 
Versailles or Taj Mahal with equality, no exquisite pieces of literature or subtle philosophy 
without a leisure class, no Athenian punctiliously egalitarian but time-consuming citizen’s 
democracy without slaves) – as it is unfairly said, the free and equal Swiss produced the 
coucou-clock.   3 
 
  Hence, are not claims of equality superfluous, obnoxious, unfounded, dangerous, 
undefined and a priori contradictory? 
 
  Well and good. Observe mankind, however, and in it facts that are intrinsically linked 
to inequality.  
 
  Slaveries (still 100.000 haratins – literally, “captives” – in a country this author lived 
in, Mauretania). Racisms (including “ethnic cleansing” by Nazis, in Rwanda or in Bosnia). 
Apartheids. Sexisms of all kinds and intensities. Cultural dominations and discriminations. 
The waterfall of disregard, contempt, prohibitions and conditions of caste systems. The order 
system attacked by a revolution which defined what it violated as liberty, equality and 
fraternity (“someone who has not lived in the Ancient Regime does not know what the pain of 
living is” said Talleyrand). Then, from equal rights of property as liberty, the class system 
with exploitation of man by man in formal  freedom, starvation amid plenty and vast 
inequalities of opportunity. Revolutions against it leading to Nomenklaturas of “more equal 
than others”, the gulag and the rule of force. Dictatorships. Nepotism. Add, whatever their 
sources, wealth inequalities and average group life expectancies with 50 years differences. 
The utmost violation of isegoria, the Athenian basic democratic equal right to public 
expression, by our mass-media democracies where only journalists, media owners and 
politicians speak to the rest of the people. The view of Rousseau (a former servant) that one 
should be neither so poor as to have to hire oneself nor rich enough to be able to rent 
someone. “Saved-skin” as the West Indian name for babies born with a clear complexion. 
 
  But also, in the then crystallizing caste system, the birth of the antidote, the 
enlightened emancipating lightening of the Buddha admitting in his sangha (community) a 
chandala woman – a bastard of an outcast and a foreigner, the lowest and worst of all – thus 
inventing the universal equal value of all humans, later transmitted to stoicism and from it to 
Christianity (Saint Paul’s “there is no longer neither slave nor free man, man nor woman, jew 
nor gentile”) and to the modern world. Equal treatment of equals in the relevant 
characteristics implied by the simple rationality of the possibility of justifying, giving a reason 
– at least prima facie, in the absence of an overpowering reason (e.g. impossibility or the 
possibility of making everybody better off with inequality). Faute de mieux, finally, the   4 
eschatological dream-time equalities of the classless society, the chain of karma lives, and the 
Christian equalizing positive discrimination of the wealth-related access to paradise. 
 
1.3 Equality as first virtue of society 
 
This basketful of facts, emotions and reasons, from all nooks of mankind in time, place and 
issue, shows the overwhelming importance of both the question of equality and of its 
necessary conceptual clarification. It shows that equality may be so bad that only one thing 
can be worse: its absence. “Inequality is the source of all evil” is Rousseau’s (1755) clear-cut 
conclusion of a nevertheless elaborate investigation. Aristotle and Rawls see justice as actual 
or ideal equality and find it to be the first virtue of society. Indeed, “Justice is equality, as 
everybody thinks it is, quite apart from other considerations” is Aristotle’s teaching to the 
king’s son in Nicomachean Ethics. Social ethical equality, our topic here, is almost 
consubstantial with the concepts of justice in the same field (social justice, distributive justice, 
compensatory justice, rectification justice, commutative justice, diorthic justice, etc.), but we 
will consider the issues from the equality angle first here. 
 
1.4 Of what? 
 
Of course, equality can a priori be of many things, with often opposite actual consequences. It 
is commonly thought to mean equality in incomes or goods. It can also be in liberty, however. 
Historically, in fact, the first and main demand for general equality was equality in rights and 
notably in basic rights which are essentially liberties (“men are free and equal in rights” is the 
opening statement of the 1789 Declaration). This freedom from forceful interference can be 
and has been seen as forbidding income redistribution, thus as meaning equal full self-
ownership, and implying a precise opposite of income equality! Equality may be not in goods 
but in the (psychological) welfare or “happiness” people derive from them thanks to their 
capacities to enjoy. On the contrary, it can be in the (other) resources given to society, and 
therefore in the real liberty of using them, thus complementing the formal liberty provided by 
the basic rights. If these resources are attached to the individuals, as their earning capacities or 
social conditions are, transfers or specific policies achieve this equalization. This can give 
various equalities of opportunity. Equality can also be in the variety of social relations, 
processes, statuses, situations or conditions. Of particular importance is political equality, 
equality in political power and civic duty, and its manifestation in democracy. Finally, one   5 
kind of equality is particularly fundamental in the ethics of modernity: that of the basic moral 
worth of humans as such, with the attached respect, consideration, dignity and social and 
material consequences. Ontological equality refers to our common humanity which should be 
respected in all its instances (basic moral equality). In Kant’s words, all humans are equal in 
the kingdom of ends, and no one should consider any other as a means only. Equality can also 
appear in different types of rules that permit to determine individual situations. It is, for 
instance, an equality of weights in utilitarianism or in the highest social income (highest sums 
of individuals’ utilities or incomes). Equality is also sometimes rule-equality (or functional 
equality), that is, the items of individuals are derived from their specific given or chosen 
characteristics by the same rule or function. As it will shortly be noted, this is the very 
structure of rationality in the sense of providing a reason, with important consequences. 
 
1.5 Equality and modernity. Formal and real equalities 
 
The equalities considered here are results of choices by society, often by institutions but 
sometimes by individuals. In almost all societies there are peer groups with some values of 
equality between their members, and, often, equalities of certain types with larger extensions. 
However, we are also particularly interested in equality in the ethics of modernity. The logical 
analysis of equality will apply to all cases. The ethics of modernity is characterized by the 
acceptance or demand, by large majorities of populations, of certain equalities for large 
populations, universally for some equalities. These ideal values are, first, moral basic worth, 
classical basic rights and some sort of democracy. Respect, and basic rights when the 
distribution of resources is given, are non-rival, and therefore the demands may simply be that 
each person has them, which implies their equality. In contrast with these consensual values 
of the ethic of modernity, this ethic is deeply divided with regard to the distribution of goods, 
the economic values. The polar positions are, on the one hand, a divided family of egalitarians 
who favour equality in incomes, goods, resources or welfare and, on the other hand, classical 
liberals who advocate self-ownership – and hence, by the way, equal self-ownership for all. 
This issue and the resulting structure of the optimum distributions will be analyzed in section 
5. Note that since (prima facie) equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics turns 
out to be a logically necessary property of a determinate social choice with minimal 
rationality (section 4), equality appears in two different ways in social choice: as this 
necessary property of all social ethics which applies to the particular equalizand and scope of   6 
this ethics – it can in particular be an equal freedom, for instance –, and as the particular 
values of the noted family of distributional “egalitarians”. 
 
  We will note various possible structural properties of the object of equality. Presently 
just notice that equality can be between individuals but also between groups or institutions 
variously defined (with, possibly, the problem of relating the situation of the group to that of 
its members). These social entities amenable to judgments of justice are the “justiciables”. For 
simplicity in presentation, however, we will use expressions of equality between persons or 
individuals only. 
 
2. Why equality? 
 
Equality raises two classical questions: “of what?” (including between whom and in what 
circumstances) and “why?”. The operational question is “of what?” However, it seems that it 
can be answered if and only if we first have the answer to the other, apparently deeper 
question, “why?” The issue is quite more subtle, however. Consider, for instance, very 
common expressions such as “all humans should equally have the basic rights”, or “at least 
survival food”. The reason is that each should have these rights or food, that is, the “of what”. 
This “of what” constitutes the reason for this equality, it explains it. The answer to “of what” 
entails the answer to “why”. In this case, the mention of equality is in fact redundant. Yet it is 
often emphasized for reasons shortly noted. In another example, the very commonly given 
reason “I divide this cake equally because I see no reason to divide it otherwise” has a 
puzzling logic shortly analyzed (section 4). In other cases, equality and its reason or value are 
just two different names for the same thing, as with the most important equality as non-
domination or non-subjection. 
 
  When reasons for equality are considered, the striking fact is that there is not one 
reason or motive for equality but many of them, of very different and often unrelated kinds. 
The two most important types of reason for equality are of totally different natures. One is 
equality as logic or rationality. It concerns the reason for “equal treatment of equals”, the 
logic of justification, the property of “permutability” and the meanings of justifying equality 
by the absence of a sufficient reason for inequality (section 4). The other type is social. It is 
equality as non-subjection and non-domination, a protective or negative relational equality, 
justified by this type of liberty, and extending to the general properties of relations between   7 
equals (sections 3 and 11). Equality as rationality can apply to all issues – economic, social, 
political. 
 
  Logic, if one dares say, is also a reason for equality which is trivial from its viewpoint, 
a tautology, and is nevertheless often repeated sometimes with great emphasis and great 
importance attached to it. This is equality as generality or universality, meaning that each 
member of a given group has or should have some given property of any nature. This is 
extended into a comparison: each member has, all members have, all members equally have. 
This property then is general to the members of the group. It is “universal” in this group, but 
the term “universal” is often reserved for cases in which the group is all mankind. Logically, 
the mention of equality is redundant. Its presence may have two reasons aiming at reinforcing 
the claim or value. One is to draw attention on the fact that, in the present or past states, some 
members only have or had the property. Another may be to appeal to other reasons for 
equality, namely comparative fairness based on the logical reasons mobilized by the emphasis 
that the persons in question have the same relevant characteristics. 
 
  Comparative equality results from the comparison of persons’ endowments of the 
items relevant in nature and in measure (e.g. the appropriate relative concepts) (section 7). 
Equality then results from sentiments of relative fairness, and it rules out the various social 
sentiments that may be aroused by inequality. This fairness, however, is based on the notion 
that the persons have the same relevant characteristics (no one deserves, needs or is entitled to 
or accountable for more than the other) and on the logical reasons. The “equity-no-envy” 
principle (each prefers her own) holds a central place in equality analyses. 
 
  Equality, therefore, is essentially a derived value. It derives from direct (end-) values 
by implications which are varied and opposite in type and direction. In the various cases, it is 
a condition, a cause or a consequence. It is factually identical with non-domination and hence 
morally a consequence of it. Directly comparative approval of equality result from some 
sentiment of propriety perhaps supported by the justification from rationality. However, it is 
not sure that equality is or can be valued as an end in itself, directly, although it may look like 
this in some egalitarian judgments that appear as gut feelings or flashes of moral intuition, 
previous to considered analysis (the opposite of the search for a good reason). This may 
concern, in particular, the basic worth of humans, relational equality in itself (relation   8 
between equals), comparative fairness, the impossibility of a reason for inequality, and the 
pure quasi-aesthetic value of balance and symmetry. 
 
  When the relevant equality is impossible or costly on other grounds, some reasons for 
it or judgments favouring it can extend to preferring lower corresponding inequalities. This 
extends considerably the complexity of the problem and constitutes a vast field of studies 
(alluded to in section 10). When what is wrong with inequality is that people who have the 
least have too little, and if another situation can improve their situation sufficiently without 
diriment costs in the other people’s endowments of this item or otherwise, the solution may be 
to maximize the lowest endowments or “maximin” (“practical justice” for interpersonally 
comparable ordinal utilities in Kolm (1971), the “difference principle” for an index of 
“primary goods” in Rawls (1971), or Parfit’s (1995) “prioritarianism”). 
 
  Finally, some equalities induce, entail or require others. This can result from the 
existence of strictly complementary goods. For instance, enjoying some right or liberty may 
require some condition or some amount of some good. But the most famous and classical 
example is Pigou’s derivation of equal income from the utilitarian highest sum – hence with 
equal weights – of identical concave individual utility function. A more elaborate similar 
property is the basis of the present-day welfarist theory of the measures of inequality. 
 
  The essential question of the relations between equality and liberty will be split in two: 
equality as liberty, the historically most important relational equality of non-subjection and 
non-domination, and equality of liberty, including the basic rights and the various cases of 
equality of freedom of choice and of opportunity. 
 
3. Equality as liberty: the defensive relational equality of non-domination and non-
subjection 
 
Equality, nowadays, is commonly considered as opposed to liberty. This usually refers to 
inequalities in income and wealth resulting from free exchange, and to interferences by public 
redistributions tending to reduce these inequalities. It sometimes also refers more 
philosophically to freedom permitting the manifestation of differences in preferences in a 
diversity seen as an inequality. However, liberty and equality entered – and founded – the 
modern world not as enemies but as associates, or, rather, as identical situations. Such a   9 
radical change as overthrowing the “feudal” order required the association of these two 
powerful values. “Men are free and equal in rights” (the 1789 Declaration) transmutes 
dominated subjects into equal and free citizens. 
 
  Non-subjection and non-domination are, indeed, both the most basic equality and the 
most basic liberty. Relations are more intrinsic to society than comparisons are, and, in a 
relation, freedom from the other’s command and equality are practically synonyms. 
Domination is a person’s power to have another do something, notably by force or threat. By 
nature, the corresponding subjection is the most vicious of unfreedoms since, in it, a person’s 
will determines another’s acts. It is in essence worse than a simple constraint, not only 
because of the a priori uncertainty, but, much more basically, because it constitutes a kind of 
amputation of part of the dominated self, and this substitution of wills, this occupation of the 
other’s command center by force (or ruse), is the annihilation of the condition for self-respect 
and dignity. Domination is usually maintained by force, but it may be worse when the subject 
endorses the situation in “voluntary serfdom” as Montaigne’s friend La Boétie puts it. The 
situation admits of degrees, however, depending on possibilities and costs of avoiding the 
domination. Slavery is one extreme, and there are many forms of it. Avoiding subjection is 
sometimes prevented by a status of lower caste one is born in. Serfdom of diverse types also 
exists, as do life servants for the same master. Domination sometimes maskerades as free 
exchange which is fictitious when the alternative is starvation or dire poverty. The wage 
relationship differs from an exchange of services by its being subjection to the boss’s orders 
within some limits, and the wage earner may have no real alternative or, perhaps, has the only 
choice to replace one boss by another. This limited possibility to leave the relation has as 
other effect a low wage, hence inequality in this respect also, and situations of unequal 
exchange and exploitation. Intrafamily domination and emancipation towards equal status, 
power and rights and duties is a major problem of mankind. The domination can also be 
group-wise, as with colonial situations, and equal status obtained by independence or 
liberation. All this covers, of course, a large variety of situations according to cases, places 
and historical periods. 
 
  The absence of subjection, or of strong forms of it, is jointly an equality in itself, 
relational, and, if all members of a group (or of mankind) have to be free from the 
corresponding domination, an equality of liberty and an equality as generality (or 
universality).   10 
 
4. Equality from logic 
 
4.1 An overview 
 
The basic property is equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics. It results from 
logic for two different reasons. In one, equality as rationality, it results from rationality in the 
relevant and most common sense of providing a reason, justifying. This holds whatever the 
reason, and even from simply being favourable to provide a reason since it is a necessary 
condition for all reasons. The second way in which logic requires equal treatment of equals is 
the property of “permutable treatment of equals” plus the requirement of full determination 
(unicity) of the result. However, equality of equals is sometimes an inferior solution and, then, 
“permutable treatment” is the second-best logically egalitarian concept. These are the topics 
of the two next sections. We then appraise the very famous principle of “non-sufficient 
reason” for inequality and show that it is either fallacious, tautological in two possible ways, 
or any of the two above reasons. 
 
  The relevant characteristics may include, notably, a description of the relations to 
possibilities. At any rate, this equality can be prima facie, that is, in the absence of an 
overriding reason which may be impossibility or the joint relevance of some other value 
(which may be the ideal equality of something else, a unanimous benefit from leaving 
equality, and so on). 
 
4.2 Equality from rationality 
 
Equal is rational, rational is equal. Indeed, rational, in its most common sense, used here, 
means to give a reason, to justify, or to begin to do it or at least to intend to. It opposes 
irrational, unjustified or arbitrary. Assume individual (justiciable) i receives xi of the relevant 
item of any nature (goods, income, wealth, position, right, freedom, power, respect, honour, 
reputation, consideration, bundles of these, etc.; the item may even be a rule providing 
something to an individual as a function of some facts possibly including some characteristics 
of hers, and the equality is that the same rule is used for various persons, a derived rule-
equality which will shortly appear to be the very form of rationality itself). If this xi is 
intrinsically justified, given a reason for, this reason a priori refers to a number of relevant   11 
characteristics of individual i, of any nature. The set of these relevant characteristics is 
denoted as yi. The reason that leads to choose xi because of yi is described by a function 
    xi=r(yi).                  (1) 
Note that we write (1) rather than xi=ri(yi) with a function ri proper to individual i because, in 
this case, the reasons, a priori proper to individual i, that leads one to write ri should be 
included in the set of relevant characteristics yi and the function takes form (1). Moreover, a 
complete social choice determines a unique xi, and then r is a proper function. Then, if 
another person, j, has an identical (equal) set of relevant characteristics, yj=yi, relation (1) 
implies that she receives xj=xi. This equality is derived from the simple requirement of 
justifying, giving a reason, that is, from social rationality. 
 
  Note that this rationality provides, in fact, two (equivalent) types of equality: a 
conditional equality, xi=xj if yi=yj, and a functional equality meaning that the same function r 
is used for all individuals, which manifests the universality of rationality (giving a reason) 
fully applied. The former is also substitutability, that is, if another individual j than i, for 
which yj=yi, is substituted to individual i, then xj=xi. The latter is also called rule-equality, that 
is, the same rule r, rather than specific rules ri possibly different for different i, relates yi to xi; 
rationality (in this most common sense) implies rule-equality.
1 In this rational equality, there 
is no direct comparison between xi and xj. Their equality results from a requirement of 
rationality when yi=yj.
2 Sentiments of justice or fairness refer in particular to the choice of the 
relevant characteristics yi. This choice implies the answer to the question “equality among 
whom?” A particular form of characteristics yi is simply “belonging to a certain set of 
individuals I”; then the xi of all these individuals should be prima facie equal. 
 
  The property of equal xi for equal yi holds irrespective of the specific reason r. The 
simple fact of giving a reason, justifying, suffices for this result. This is the common grounds 
of all reasons and a necessary property for the existence of a reason. Hence, the mere a priori 
posture or intention to provide a reason whatever it is suffices for the result “xi=xj if yi=yj”. 
This is strictly minimal rationality. 
 
                                                 
1 The converse is not true, although it generally holds. Most rules describe reasons. Logically, 
however, there can be rules not justifiable from a reason. 
2 If direct comparisons are furthermore introduced (see section 7), function r may also depend on xj for 
j¹i for these comparisons. Then, it should also depend on yj , and yj=yi entails the comparison between 
xi and xj which favours xi= xj.   12 
  A remarkable consequence is that if one has to share something perfectly divisible 
between a number of persons who have no other relevant different characteristic, their yi is – 
or amounts to – belonging to this group and hence is the same for all, and general a priori 
rationality (and more generally any particular rule consistent with the constraint) requires 
equal sharing. No reason can give another choice: any other choice is necessarily without a 
rule and hence without a reason – i.e. irrational. Equal sharing is the only rational (and 
ruleful) solution (a unique one if all the good is distributed). This is, of course, what is usually 
done. An example can be drawing lots between these persons: rationality requires allocating 
equal probabilities to them.  
 
4.3 Permutable treatment of equals 
 
Denote as zi=(xi, yi) the pair of xi and yi. Choose the set of characteristics yi as being 
sufficiently encompassing for zi to include all that concerns person i for the judgment under 
consideration. Then, if individual i is attributed zj instead of zi whereas individual j is 
attributed zi instead of zj, the two social states are not relevantly discernible and are equivalent 
for this evaluation. Hence, any permutation of the zi between the persons i creates equivalent 
social states. Consider now that all the individuals i belonging to a subset I have the same sets 
of characteristics yi=y. Then permuting the zi=(xi, y) between persons i of I is identical to the 
same permutation of the xi only between them. Hence, these permutations of the xi give 
equivalent social states. This is permutable treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics. 
Consider three applications of this property. 
 
4.4 Full determination 
 
If some of these xi differ from one another, these permuted social states are not all identical 
since at least one individual has different xi in some of these states. However a virtue of a 
principle of social choice is that it be complete, providing full determination, that is, it 
designates only one of the alternative social states rather than several equivalent ones. Indeed, 
notably, action and implementation is the realization of one of these mutually exclusive 
possible alternatives only, and the principle fully plays its role of guiding the choice solely if 
it has this property. 
   13 
  Now the states derived by the permutations of the xi between the persons i of I (with 
yi=y) are one and the same state if and only if all these xi are the same. This is equal treatment 
of equals in the relevant characteristics. Therefore, permutable treatment of equals plus full 
determination implies equal treatment of equals. 
 
4.5 Permutability as second-best equality 
 
However, it may be that, actually, some unequal treatment of equals is better than equal 
treatment of equals. For instance, some collective tasks are better performed with a 
hierarchical organization of the people, even if they a priori have the same capacities. This is 
conspicuous for the military defense of society, but it is also the case for many productive or 
administrative tasks: firms and administrations have everywhere a hierarchical organization. 
Then, people have different powers, which usually entails different statuses (and unequal 
pays). Society (and all its members) may also benefit from a differentiated education of 
people, even if their abilities in all respects are a priori identical. Savings provides another 
example. Aggregate savings become investment and provide growth. Since people usually 
save a larger fraction of their income when this income is larger, an unequal distribution of 
income provides higher aggregate savings even if people have the same propensity to save (as 
a function of their income). For a similar reason, private support of the arts benefit from 
unequal income distributions (with rich sponsors). There may also simply be a limited number 
of non-divisible consumption goods or tools, and it is usually better that they are actually 
distributed and used rather than not using them at all which is the feasible equality. In all such 
cases, unequal treatment of a priori equals is generally better than possible equal treatment. 
Everybody may benefit from it. 
 
  In such situations, permutations of the different xi – ranks, education, incomes or items 
– among individuals i with identical yi=y provide social states that cannot be judged otherwise 
than “equally good” from an external standpoint although they are not so for each individual. 
This permutable treatment of equals is the “egalitarian” property of such cases. The property 
it keeps from equal treatment of equals is the equal social value – in some sense – of 
permutations of individuals’ allocations. It is a kind of second-best egalitarianism. The 
drawback is that the corresponding social choice is no longer fully determined by the problem 
alone. A strictly egalitarian desire to equalize the individual situations leads to an overall 
worsening. Using lotteries or rotation are classical means to face such situations (both were   14 
used, for instance, by the Athenian democracy to fill official positions). Lottery provides a 
choice with the possibility of ex ante equality, but it leaves the actual, ex post, inequality. 
 
4.6 The principle of non-sufficient reason 
 
Answering the question “Why equality?” by the trivial “Why not?” seems hardly serious. 
However, “if there is no reason for inequality, choose equality” (or “if there is no good, valid 
or sufficient reason for it”) is the “reason” for equality proposed by innumerable people, 
including some of the best minds (Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, Hobbes in Leviathan, 
Locke in the Second Treatise on Government – with the addition “If God wanted us to treat 
them unequally, he world have given us a sign” –, Conrdorcet in his 1789 proposal for a 
Declaration of Rights, and nowadays, after Berlin in 1956, Benn, Peters, Hart, Graham, 
Bedeau, Lukes, Williams, Brandt, Brown, Hare, Frankena, Perelman, Grinsberg, Barry, Parfit, 
Miller, Sandmo, Atkinson, Marcil-Lacoste, Norman, Tugendhat, Rawls who proposes that a 
good reason would be that everybody or the poorest benefit from inequality, and so on). 
Consider, however, the following properties of this most famous position for equality. 
(1) Indeed, if there is no reason, or good or sufficient reason, for inequality, what else 
can one advocate but equality? This seems to be a tautology about providing reasons. Any 
other choice would be irrational or arbitrary. 
(2) However, if this argument in favour of equality is of any use, this implies that there 
is no other sufficient reason for equality either. Then, consider any state with inequality. 
There is no reason for any other state, with equality or inequality. Therefore, the same 
argument leads one to advocate this specific unequal state. Finally, this argument leads one to 
choose any state, equal or unequal. This apparent tautology is in fact worse: a fallacy. 
(3) The same reasoning is the “principle of non-sufficient reason” which is the basis of 
the axiomatic epistemic foundation of the theory of probability, introduced by Laplace and… 
Condorcet: if there is no reason for an event to be more likely than another, attribute equal 
probabilities to them. However, it is, there, an axiom. This suggests that, in social ethics, this 
statement could just express a “moral taste”, an a priori preference for equality. What it adds 
to just expressing this is open-mindedness: if there is a reason, a fortiori a good or valid 
reason, and unavoidably a sufficient reason, for states with inequality, one is ready to abandon 
this preference. However, equality and inequality are a priori unevenly treated: a reason is 
required for inequality, not for equality. This is a prima facie preference for equality. But not   15 
a justified one, so far. Why this unequal treatment of equality and inequality, this 
asymmetrical status of symmetry and asymmetry? 
(4) However, preferences also intervene for deciding what counts as a good, valid, 
acceptable, and in the end sufficient reason for inequality, that is, one that can override the 
choice of equality. Therefore, the statement is: “I choose equality if I do not prefer something 
else to equality”. However, this can mean two things, depending on whether just preference is 
considered or the necessity of choosing also is. First, we have pointed out that this choice of 
equality is to be seen as resulting from a preference. Hence, the statement just says: “I prefer 
equality if I do not prefer something else to equality”. This is a strange preference structure 
which omits indifference. Second, in fact, a choice has to be made between mutually 
exclusive alternatives. Then, the statement becomes: “I prefer to choose equality rather than 
anything else if I do not prefer to choose anything else rather than equality”, which now is a 
tautology. 
(5) Nevertheless, the absence of reason for inequality may also mean two other things. 
One is that no imaginable reason for an overall allocation gives inequality. This certainly 
implies that all possibly relevant characteristics yi – which could a priori be used for such a 
reason – are identical for all i. Then, for any reason r, the definite xi=r(yi) are also identical for 
all i. This simply is the general a priori equal treatment of equals. 
(6) In particular we have to choose the allocations xi to the individuals i who belong to 
a certain set I, and we have no (other) reason for this choice. Hence, the relevant characteristic 
of these individuals is only that they belong to the set I. This is yi for all these i. Hence these yi 
are identical. Then any reason based on them gives identical xi for all i. Note that, here, there 
is no a priori other reason neither for equality nor for inequality. 
(7) A different type of reason can justify the principle. With sufficient sets of 
characteristics yi, permutations of the individuals’ pairs zi=(xi, yi) among the individuals are 
not discernible. Then, if all these yi are equal (perhaps just for i belonging to the set I), this 
permutation is identical to a permutation of the individual allocations xi only among the 
individuals. These permutations are therefore equivalent for any impartial judgment. If one is 
a solution, so are the others. Yet, when the xi are not all equal, some of these permuted states 
differ from one another since at least one individual receives different xi. However, a 
complete social choice consists of a unique solution. Then, this can only happen if the xi are 
all equal. Equality results from permutable treatment of equals and the requirement of full 
determination of the choice. Sharing the cake between two equal individuals in proportions 
(1/3, 2/3) or (2/3, 1/3) is equivalent in moral terms although it is not for each individual. For   16 
the proportion (1/2, 1/2) only this multiplicity is avoided. We have pointed out cases in which 
equal treatment of equals is less good than equal allocations, but the outcome then is not 
uniquely determined. 
 
  Finally, the non-sufficient reason for equality is either a fallacy, one of two 
tautologies, or any of the two basic logical requirements of prima facie equality. 
 
5. Equalities determining the overall distribution 
 
5.1 The five alternative equalities of distributive justice 
 
Besides the equalities protecting against force in non-subjection, basic rights and democracy, 
the most important role of equalities may concern the overall distribution of the resources of 
society. Equalities are used in many types of relations. Walzer (1983) argues that this is how 
it should be with equality in each of a variety of “spheres of justice”. One sphere, however, is 
much more important than others in volume: that in which income distribution is determined 
(especially since various services can optionally be bought with disposable income – i.e. put 
in the market sphere). This overall distribution of the resources of society through income is 
the domain of “macrojustice” – the economic dimension of the domain that John Rawls calls 
social justice. It contrasts with the multifarious issues of “microjustice” specific as regards 
goods, people or circumstances, and with issues of “mesojustice” concerned with specific 
goods but important ones that concern everybody (e.g. education and health).  
 
  For macrojustice, five polar theories of the appropriate distribution are classical and 
important claims. As for all theories of justice, they are characterized by what they hold 
should be equal. These equalizands are characterized by two aspects. One is their substance 
(material, currency, metric) such as income or resources, welfare as happiness, or, in an 
equality from generality, self-ownership. The second is their structure, as with an ideal 
equality in individuals’ income, resource endowment or welfare, or an equal weight in the 
highest sum of welfare (utilitarianism) or of incomes. Figure 1 shows this overall structure of 
the issues. The values of liberties, responsibility, entitlement, happiness, needs, deserts and 
merits are implicit, as shortly seen. 
 
[Equality Figure 1 about here]   17 
Figure 1. The topology of equality 
 
  These five polar equalities of social justice are very different in nature. The most 
tangible of these equalities is that of incomes. Welfare classically means, in this context, 
psychological welfare, for instance satisfaction of happiness. Economists represent it by 
individuals’ utilities. Concepts of equality, addition, or other operations, concerning such 
notions are, of course, problematic, but classical theories consider them and this may more or 
less provide rough guidelines for policies. Income egalitarians differ from welfare egalitarians 
by their holding that individuals are accountable for their own different capacities to enjoy 
(utility functions). If, in addition, people are also entitled to their own capacities to produce 
and earn, the result is equal self-ownership. It suffices, for it, to say that each individual has 
self-ownership – hence it is also an equality from redundancy, generality or universality. 
 
  Equalities in welfare or income that cannot give more to each can also be described as 
maximizing the lowest individual endowment of these items, or “maximin”. If equality is 
desired because individuals who have little of the item have too little, and if some situation 
with inequality can give more to everybody than situations with equality, equality is to be 
replaced by maximin (for instance Rawls’s (1971) “difference principle” for “primary goods” 
and Kolm’s (1971) “practical justice” for interpersonally comparable welfare). This assumes 
that policy can improve the lowest endowment without excessive cost (notably in terms of 
lowering those of other people). 
 
  Equality in weights is a priori anterior – more “upstream” – in the evaluation. 
Nevertheless, the egalitarian aspect of utilitarianism due to equal weight is classically 
forcefully (and redundantly) emphasized by Bentham quoted by John Stuart Mill: “each is to 
count for one and nobody for more than one”. It is the basis or Hare’s (1981) defense of this 
philosophy as an interpretation of Kant’s view that each individual should be given 
consideration (it seems, however, that the product of individual utilities would not give them 
less equal consideration than their sum – it amounts to comparing relative variations in 
utilities rather than their absolute variations). 
 
5.2 The bi-equality of the overall distribution 
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If everybody, which includes voters and officials, holds that some social principle is irrelevant 
for a problem, this principle cannot be implemented for this question on social grounds. Now 
people actually hold that the comparison of individuals’ capacities to enjoy (hedonistic 
capacities) or their variations, and of their tastes, is relevant for allocative choices in two types 
of cases: when they refer to suffering and when the distribution is between people who 
sufficiently know one another to feel empathy towards the others. Allocations in a hospital or 
in a family are typical cases. If national fraternity actually ruled the minds, or in case of 
national disasters creating general suffering, the principle would be welfarism. In the other 
cases, people’s opinions about income distribution are instances and associations of the other 
two cases only, income egalitarianism on the one hand, and the self-ownership of classical 
liberalism on the other. The resulting social and political synthesis or compromise is a mix of 
these two values.  
 
  The normal way of representing the resulting incomes is that they are the sum of two 
parts, an egalitarian income and a classical liberal one. For clarity, denote as i one of the n 
individuals, yi her income,  i l  her labour, wi her wage rate. Her earned income is wi i l . The 
average wage is w . The egalitarian income is the equal sharing of individuals’ earnings 
during an equal labour k, kwi for individual i. This egalitarian income is  w k . Above that, 
however, individuals are free to work  i l  and keep their earning for the extra labour, 
i i w k) ( - l . Their total income is 
  i i i w k w k y ) ( - + = l .
3 
 
  This redistribution is egalitarian in various respects. On tangible grounds, it is the 
more egalitarian the higher the equalization labour k is (it is not at all for k=0). On rational 
grounds, it has a number of remarkable egalitarian structures. It transfers equally from each in 
labour (or in equal proportion of her capacities), and to each equally. It implies an equal 
minimum income  w k . It amounts to each receiving an equal basic income  w k  financed by an 
equal labour k of each or in equal proportion k of each capacity wi. It also amounts to each 
individual yielding to each other the product  ) / ( n k wi ×  of an equal labour k/n in a kind of 
                                                 
3 For individuals participating to this redistribution, the equalization labour should be such that  i k l £  
because people do not accept taxing leisure (if  w wi > ), and providing a wage supplement (of 
) ( i w w k -  if  w wi < ) to hours which provide no wage seems absurd.   19 
general equal labour reciprocity. It is also equal free exchange (labour) from an equal 
allocation ( w k  in income and k in labour or the complementary leisure).
4 Finally, the two 
parts of income are equality according to deserts and to merit (i.e. including the effects 
personal capacities wi), respectively. 
 
6. Equality of liberty 
 
6.1 Equal negative, protective or civic liberty, or basic rights 
 
The use or threat of force may be steady or occasional. A person may incur it from others as 
individuals, in groups or through institutions. The absence of such forceful interference 
defines a freedom called social, protective, negative (a term of Kant, John Stuart Mill and 
Berlin) or civic (John Stuart Mill). Its application to various specific issues constitutes the 
basic rights or basic liberties. With this freedom, a forceful constraint on someone can only 
implement a previous acceptation of it and notably a previous agreement (possibly an implicit 
one) of this person. This absence of force in inter-individual relations is an equality, and a 
general basic demand of modern society is that all individuals benefit equally from such 
liberty (equality as generality or universality). This demand is even that this liberty has 
priority. 
 
  Is this general equal liberty with priority possible, however? This raises an essential 
conceptual issue with important consequences. Many thinkers, such as Rousseau, Condorcet, 
the text of the 1789 Declaration, John Stuart Mill and Rawls have held that these basic 
liberties or rights should be, with priority, “equal for all and, then, maximal” (Rawls even 
admits inequality if this permits each to have more, as he does about “primary goods”). 
However, they consider jointly these rights and liberties plus some means to make them actual 
possibilities or “real” (Marx). However, there is no limit a priori to these means (to the 
number of private planes and airports for freedom to move, the size of the cathedrals for 
freedom of worship, the privately owned media for freedom of expression). Then, this 
principle uses all the resources of society without even a principle for choosing between these 
various real liberties. The solution of defining some amount of means for each right is a priori 
                                                 
4 Basing a tax on the wage rate can be done as in the present French tax law, by exempting overtime 
labour earnings from the income tax, over a low benchmark. There is de facto no cheating (because it 
would be too complicated to hide it from the possible controls). The full theory adds other dimensions 
of labour than duration, notably formation (Kolm 2004).   20 
arbitrary. Moreover, some kind of equality of these means for all would be found worse by 
everybody than some other, unequal solution because people make different uses of these 
rights and have different preferences about  them. 
 
  The rational solution consists of distinguishing the formal rights from the means of 
benefiting from them, and to put the question of the means in that of the general distribution 
and of the free exchanges of goods resulting from it (with the possibility of some minimum 
income – see section 5). Then, when actions or intentions of different individuals oppose one 
another and cannot be implemented jointly, this opposition can be attributed to the means and 
is solved by the property rights about them (for instance the occupation of the same place at 
some time) and not to the “formal” rights in themselves. Then these rights are non-rival 
between themselves and can be equally held in full and used at satiety by everybody. 
 
6.2 Equal real liberty 
 
The next issue about liberty concerns people’s means of free action. This is the topic of 
section 5. The necessary distinction between general “macrojustice” and more specific issues 
of “microjustice” and “mesojustice” is explained there. The basic liberties imply equal free 
exchange, given the overall income allocation. The theory of macrojustice obtains a structure 
of distribution which can be defined in various ways as equal liberty (although with different 




6.3 Equality of opportunity 
 
Equality of opportunity describes a set of cases of equality of liberty to be found at all levels 
and in various issues of justice. A priori it means the identity, for various agents, of a set of 
alternatives among which each can choose. In the standard and most common meaning, this 
refers to social conditions of access to certain benefits, positions, situations, jobs (for instance 
with regard to various types of discrimination or family influence) or possibilities (such as 
access to receiving types of education). The concept has been extended to transform these 
formal freedoms into more “real” ones, and these direct choices into their outcomes, by 
                                                 
5 Kolm 2004, 2008.   21 
adding the effects of personal capacities and social settings and thus considering opportunities 
for income, achieved level of education, or the actual performance required by jobs or 
positions (perhaps for given levels of effort). Equality of opportunity thus describes cases that 
are different and sometimes opposed. This explains why politicians of all kinds love the 
concept whereas practically all philosophers criticize it severely. 
 
  The initial motives for equality of opportunity came or comes from two different and 
opposed sides, one for realizing an equality and the other for criticizing another equality. The 
equality realized is that of some possibility of choice, as the name indicates (for example, one 
wants access to certain positions without discrimination or other obstacle). The other motive 
is the objection to the equalization or uniformization, for different people, of results due in 
part to their actions, and the demand to replace this equality by that of domains of choice in 
which these agents choose. Since this change generally leads to unequal results of actions, this 
stance is anti-egalitarian in this sense. The emphasis is often not only on the comparison 
between the agents but also on some competition between them, for which the equality of 
opportunity is supposed to provide fair conditions. This elicits the classical leftist judgment, 
prefering not only the “actual” equality but also or mainly the possibly convivial relationships 
jeopardized by the competition, that “equality of opportunity is good for horse races but not 
for humans”. However, equality of opportunity is also both liberty and an equality in 
possibilities the deprivation of which includes cases generally considered the most unjust 
features of societies. 
 
  The basic feature and difference between the cases consists in the definition of the 
opportunities or lack of them in question. The main one refers to discriminations limiting 
choices, according to “race”, family, caste, order, gender, faith, and so on. Even without 
formal discrimination, the principle often refers to advantages provided by family relations, 
including favouritism, nepotism, social networks, information, direct support, and the role of 
families in education at home or at school. A basic issue is whether personal capacities, innate 
or due to family influence, notably in childhood, are counted among the sources of the 
opportunities in question or not. The famous slogan “the career opened to talents” 
discriminates according to talents only, banning other social discriminations. “Positive 
discriminations” usually try to compensate the relative handicaps due to social setting and 
family influence. 
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  The simple slogan “equality of opportunity” thus covers a number of cases quite 
different and which can belong to opposite ethical positions. Formally, there are several types 
of equality of opportunity. 
-Negative equal opportunity in action bans formal social discrimination of all kinds. 
-Positive equal opportunity in action helps people who cannot perform some relevant action 
to actually perform it. 
-Equal opportunity in action and result implies that if some people choose to perform the 
same action, they will obtain the same outcome, possibly with help for those with 
unfavourable capacities or circumstances (notably social environment).  
 
  The next step would simply be equality in outcome, which is not equality of 
opportunity from the point of view of its causes, but can be equality of opportunity for the 
further use of the outcome in so far as it is an intermediate product – such as this aspect of 
education or health. 
 
6.4 Responsibility-free equality 
 
Liberty implies responsibility which requires liberty. Hence an egalitarian philosophy that 
respects freedom can be: people are entitled to or accountable for what they are responsible 
for, and the rest is equally shared. This raises the issue of defining responsibility in the 
frequent case of joint effects of actions of several people. This problem is solved when the 
actions and the sharing of the outcome result from a direct or indirect agreement since the 
participants are jointly responsible for it. In recent time, responsibility-free equality has been 
advocated the most clearly by Gerald Cohen (1989), and closely analyzed on philosophical 
grounds by Matt Matravers (2007) and on economic grounds by Marc Fleurbaey (2008) as a 
prima facie principle (e.g. someone who hurts herself may have to be helped nevertheless). 
Although responsibility raises other notoriously difficult issues and cannot be said to be the 
only criterion, these positions fostered reflection on this important topic. A particular 
application on a delicate point differenciates two main theories of what should be equal: 
Rawls (1971) and Dworkin (1981) hold people responsible for their tastes, preferences, 
capacities to enjoy or ambitions, whereas the ordinary “welfarist” theory includes 
compensations for their differences. 
 
6.5 Fundamental insurance: equal hypothetical liberty   23 
 
A “fundamental insurance” is a hypothetical mutual insurance taken by people against the risk 
of some disadvantage which, actually, they already have. This may be, for instance, having a 
poor health or having received a poor education induced by the family. This theory provides a 
rationale for corresponding compensating transfers that mitigate the inequality. It rests on a 
putative free choice (exchange) and is a “partial original position” with a “partial veil of 
ignorance”. Its assimilation of a choice concerning justice to a choice in uncertainty, a priori 
problematic, is to be accepted if this is general opinion. This is the case, for instance, for the 
European system of public health insurance: the fact that what people pay does not depend on 
their given propensities to be sick implies a “fundamental insurance” of these handicaps.
6 
 
7. Comparative egalitarianism 
 
Sentiments favouring equality are often the result of direct intuition-like comparative 
judgments. However, the logical “equal treatment of equals in the relevant characteristics” 
certainly lurks behind such emotions. Nevertheless, such judgments seem close to aesthetic 
ones, as remarked by Kant and confirmed by location on brain imagery (fair comes from a 
Germanic word referring to beauty, and the Greek and Latin concept for beauty, kalon and 
pulchrum, were never neatly and consistently distinguished from the moral good).  
 
  When the individual items that are compared have several dimensions about which the 
individuals can have different preferences, it is possible that no individual prefers any other’s 
“allocation” to her own without these individual allocations being identical. This principle, 
called equity-no-envy, is one of the most commonly used in egalitarian studies since the early 
1970s. Its egalitarian properties are readily seen. If there is one (desired) dimension only, it 
implies equality. If the individuals have identical preferences, the principle implies that they 
are indifferent between all individual allocations. However, the most important egalitarian 
property of this principle is that it amounts to an equality in liberty. Indeed, it is satisfied if 
and only if there exists a domain of choice such that each individual’s allocation can be 
chosen by this individual (with her given preferences) in a domain identical to it (the proof is 
rather easy). The analysis of this principle  in Kolm (1971), after mentions by Tinbergen and 
Foley, was followed by a large number of applications and variants reviewed by William 
                                                 
6 Fundamental insurance, a particular case of “liberal social contracts” (Kolm 1985) is also directly 
proposed by Dworkin (1981).   24 
Thomson (2008). It cannot be called “no envy” by itself because the sentiment of envy arises 
from the joint presence of the other’s and one’s own allocation in one’s “utility function”, but 
it is formally related to structural properties of a genuine theory of envy (Kolm 1995). 
 
8. Political equality: Democracy 
 
One of the most important application of equality is to politics, in the realm of democracy. 
The Athenian four equalities of democracy still provide the basic framework: 
-Equality before the law, or isonomia. 
-Equality in voting, “one man one vote”, or democracy stricto sensu. 
-Equality in public expression for influencing others, or isegoria, as equal right to time of 
speach in the assembly of citizens. 
-Equality in the access to official positions, implemented by drawing lots or by rotation. 
 
  This was for a middle-size society, with officials but a priori the possibility of mutual 
influence between citizens. Women, slaves and foreigners were excluded, and official 
positions soon became the privilege of members of influent families. 
 
  Later democracies had a variety of restrictions to voting rights or access to positions. 
In present-day mass societies, the most violated democratic equality is isegoria, since the flow 
of public messages is that of the mass media in which a tiny aristocracy of journalists, media 
owners and politicians send views, values, information (and entertainment) to the mass of the 
people who are gaggled in this respect. In relation with the inegalitarian economy, democracy 
has led to important redistributive transfers in many countries, and yet it also includes 
exchanges of campaign funds for favourable laws. The various specific rules of particular 
democratic systems also raise innumerable issues with respect to equality. In the end, the 
main egalitarian virtue of democracy is as a barrage against dictatorship, the harshest 
inequality. 
 
9. Equality and impartiality 
 
From a social point of view, humans manage to shelter two opposes selves “in their breast” as 
Adam Smith puts it. Their self-centered and partial self favours themselves and the people 
they like or have particular relations with only. But they also have an impartial self able to   25 
take an objective view putting everybody – themselves included – on the same footing: This is 
what Thomas Nagel (1986, 1991) calls “the view from nowhere” – but is there such a place as 
nowhere? 
 
  A priori, the distribution most favourable to someone’s strict interest is without 
equality. However, among situations with equality of some kind, one (in general) is most 
favourable to this person’s interest than the others. For instance it is equal incomes (barring 
incentive effects) for people with low earning power, and equal self-ownership in the free 
market for people with high earning power. The person’s impartial self, however, will make a 
third choice, with some sort of equality. But will this latter choice be the same for everybody? 
This is often believed, for instance by Adam Smith, by John Stuart Mill who believes that the 
equality is that of the weight in an egalitarian sum of utilities (and probably by Thomas 
Nagel). However, the only logical requirement of an impartial judgment is that it respects 
equality of some sort. Hence, there is a priori a very large choice for such a judgment. 
Moreover, the impartial individual evaluation uses some psychological characteristics of this 
person which a priori differ from one person to the other. Therefore, there are a priori 
different impartial evaluations (hence with different equalities) for the various individuals – 
other phenomena such as a common moral culture or mutual influence through dialog can 
change this. 
 
  This occurs in particular for the most famous modern theory of impartiality, the theory 
of the original position in which each individual considers she has an equal chance of being 
any of the actual individuals (Harsanyi (1976); Rawls’s (1971) theory introduces other 
elements). Each individual’s such evaluation depends on her preferences about being the 
various individuals and about risk, and hence is specific to her. The logical solution consists 
in considering original positions of original positions in a converging recurring series (Kolm 
2004). 
 
10. Equality as lower inequality 
 
Philosophers discuss equality, but since large equalities never exist in real life, sociologists 
study inequality and economists compare and measure inequalities. This comparison and 
measure of inequality has developed into a very large field of studies from the mid-1960s. 
Questions such as the following are analyzed. Does income inequality increase or decrease   26 
when all incomes vary in the same proportion of by the same amount? Does a transfer from a 
richer person to a poorer one diminish inequality (it augments the inequalities between the 
poorer and the equally poor and still poorer, and between the richer and the equally rich and 
still richer)? Are the relevant inequalities relative or absolute? And so on.
7 Multidimensional 
inequalities and inequalities in liberty are also studied. The Handbook of Income Inequality 
Measurement, edited by Jacques Silber (2000), gathers the reflections of most of the experts.  
 
  Multidimensional equalities, that is, equalities in each of several goods, for produced 
goods and since people a priori have different tastes, are in general such that other, unequal 
distributions are preferred by everybody. However, there are allocations of these goods that 
do not have this property and can be defined as the “most equal ones” in this case. But if each 
individual consumes some of each good, the solution amounts to equal incomes.
8 One famous 
proposal of such multidimensional equality is Sen’s (1985) for individuals’ “capabilities”; the 
noted result applies to it. 
 
11. Positive relational equalities, reciprocity 
 
Equality in social relations is not only non-domination, not too unequal distribution or non-
envy. It has many other dimensions. Equality can also be in status, respect and consideration, 
with, notably, mutual respect and consideration. In such a society, people relate with one 
another on an equal footing and interact with others as alter ego. They are knights of the 
round table of society. Such a society of equals is something else than an egalitarian society, 
although it certainly limits the inequalities of various types. It adds a requirement of liberty in 
the consideration of others, which situates these relations on the verge of fraternity.
9 
 
  These positive relational equalities can be supported by a basic sociopsychological 
property of humans, the tendency to treat others and relate to them as they treat you and relate 




                                                 
7 Kolm 1966. 
8 See Kolm 1977, 1996b. 
9 Interesting discussions of relations between equals can be found in particular in Mauss (1924), and 
Miller and Norman in Mason (1998).   27 
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